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Background and aims: People who hoard form intense attachments to their possessions and save items for sentimental
and instrumental reasons. Feeling socially excluded may encourage these individuals to anthropomorphize objects
(i.e., perceive them as human-like) to fulﬁll unmet belonging needs, which may increase the sentimental and
instrumental values of objects, and then lead to stronger object attachment. Methods: We randomly assigned 331
participants with excessive acquisition tendencies to be excluded, included, or overincluded in an online ball-tossing
game before presenting them with ﬁve objects that had human characteristics. Participants then completed measures
assessing anthropomorphism, sentimental and instrumental values, and object attachment. Results: Inconsistent with
this study hypothesis, socially excluded participants did not rate unowned objects as more human-like than the
included or overincluded participants; however, stronger anthropomorphism predicted greater instrumental and
sentimental values, which then predicted greater object attachment. Discussion and conclusions: Sentimental and
instrumental values may explain how stronger anthropomorphism may lead to greater object attachment. Learning
that leads to anthropomorphism may help us better understand object attachment.
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INTRODUCTION
Hoarding disorder (HD) is characterized by difﬁculty dis-
carding possessions regardless of their actual value, which
then results in excessive clutter that leads to signiﬁcant
distress and impairment for individuals who live within and
nearby the affected home (American Psychiatric Associa-
tion, 2013). Although more than two thirds of individuals
with HD excessively acquire items, almost all research into
hoarding has focused on discarding difﬁculties (Frost,
Rosenﬁeld, Steketee, & Tolin, 2013; Frost, Tolin, Steketee,
Fitch, & Selbo-Bruns, 2009; Timpano et al., 2011). The
limited research into excessive acquisition has shown that
individuals with acquiring difﬁculties experience more severe
hoarding problems and social impairment in comparison to
non-acquirers (Frost et al., 2013; Norberg, Crone, Kwok, &
Grisham, 2018; Timpano et al., 2011). These ﬁndings
suggest that examining factors associated with excessive
acquisition may be important in improving existing treatment
for individuals with HD who also have acquiring difﬁculties.
The cognitive-behavioral model of hoarding posits that
individuals who hoard demonstrate excessive object attach-
ment to their possessions and save them due to elevated
perceptions of an item’s sentimental and/or instrumental
values (Frost & Hartl, 1996). According to Frost and
Steketee (2008), sentimental value refers to the symbolic
meaning of an item and its ability to provide comfort and
support, due to its association with an important person or
event. Instrumental value, on the other hand, refers to
judgments about the potential use, function, or need for a
possession (Frost & Steketee, 2008). Although the model
speciﬁes that individuals who hoard acquire and like objects
due to their greatly perceived sentimental and instrumental
values, it does not specify the process that leads to these
extreme judgment values. Nor do compulsive buying theo-
ries, which focus on a preoccupation with buying and lack
of impulse control (O’Guinn & Faber, 1989; Ridgway,
Kukar-Kinney, & Monroe, 2008).
Examining belonging and self-esteem needs may help
improve our understanding of why individuals with HD
assign elevated judgment values to objects. Social psychol-
ogists posit that individuals have an innate need to maintain
interpersonal relationships to achieve a sense of belonging-
ness and to maintain positive self-evaluations, and thus,
social exclusion motivates people to seek out positive social
contact (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Leary & Baumeister,
2000; Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995; Park &
Maner, 2009). In support of this, social psychological
research has shown that socially excluded individuals report
a diminished sense of belonging, control, and self-esteem,
and express greater interest in turning to others to renew a
* Corresponding author: Melissa M. Norberg; Department of
Psychology, Centre for Emotional Health, Macquarie University,
Bldg C3A, Room 714, Sydney 2109, NSW, Australia; Phone:
+61 2 9850 8127; E-mail: melissa.norberg@mq.edu.au
This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License,
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium for non-commercial purposes, provided the original author and
source are credited, a link to the CC License is provided, and changes – if any – are indicated.
ISSN 2062-5871 © 2018 The Author(s)
FULL-LENGTH REPORT Journal of Behavioral Addictions 7(4), pp. 1132–1142 (2018)
DOI: 10.1556/2006.7.2018.98
First published online October 12, 2018
sense of social connection in comparison to non-excluded
individuals (Maner, DeWall, Baumeister, & Schaller, 2007;
Williams & Zadro, 2001).
As individuals with HD often suffer from interpersonal
problems and are socially isolated, their ability to gain
guidance or support from loved ones when distressed
may be limited (Grisham, Steketee, & Frost, 2008; Medard
& Kellett, 2014; Nordsletten, de la Cruz, Billotti, &
Mataix-Cols, 2013). As a result, individuals who hoard
may form a strong attachment to objects due to recurrent
unmet esteem and belonging needs (Fromm, 1947). This
pattern of turning to objects to fulﬁll interpersonal needs
begins in childhood when parents are unavailable, as
children form an emotional bond to human-like objects as
a parental replacement (Gjersoe, Hall, & Hood, 2015). In
adulthood, research using non-clinical samples has shown
that socially excluded individuals shop to fulﬁll unmet
interpersonal needs (Lastovicka & Sirianni, 2011) and prefer
products that represent their afﬁliation to a group (Mead,
Baumeister, Stillman, Rawn, & Vohs, 2011). Moreover,
research on social inclusion has also shown that under-
graduates who are instructed to write about a time they felt
supported assigned less value to owned and novel items in
comparison to those who wrote about a positive restaurant
experience (Clark et al., 2011). As many individuals with
HD are socially isolated, deriving a sense of security in
objects may help compensate for unmet social needs.
One explanation for the ability of objects to substitute for
human connections is anthropomorphism. Anthropomor-
phism involves attributing human-like qualities to objects,
such as free will or agency (Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo,
2007). Research has found that undergraduate students
attributed more human-like personality traits onto inanimate
objects after being primed to recall a time they felt lonely
compared to undergraduates who were not primed with
loneliness (Bartz, Tchalova, & Fenerci, 2016; Eyssel &
Reich, 2013). Chronically lonely individuals have also been
shown to assign more human-like traits to inanimate objects
than less lonely individuals (Epley, Akalis, Waytz, &
Cacioppo, 2008). As research using non-clinical and
subclinical hoarding populations has shown that greater
anthropomorphic tendencies are positively associated with
greater acquisition tendencies (Burgess, Graves, & Frost,
2018; Timpano & Shaw, 2013) and greater overall hoarding
severity (Neave, Jackson, Saxton, & Hönekopp, 2015;
Neave, Tyson, McInnes, & Hamilton, 2016), it is possible
that anthropomorphism may increase the value of objects for
those with HD. However, this has not yet been studied in the
context of social exclusion.
Exploring general and situational-dependent determinants
that inﬂuence anthropomorphism may provide a better un-
derstanding of how anthropomorphism may impact object
value. In regard to general determinants, social and consumer
psychological researchers have shown that people are more
likely to anthropomorphize objects that share physical or
schematic similarities to humans (e.g., Aggarwal & McGill,
2007) and that they are likely to evaluate humanized brands
more positively than non-humanized brands (e.g., Delbaere,
McQuarrie, & Phillips, 2011). Epley et al.’s (2007) three-
factor theory of anthropomorphism highlights the possible
role of situational-dependent determinants. Their sociality
motivation tenet proposes that social disconnection instills an
unmet need for belonging, which prompts anthropomor-
phism, which then provides an individual with a sense of
human connection, whereas their effectance motivation tenet
proposes that human-like objects provide a mechanism for
establishing control and understanding the world (e.g., My
car didn’t start because it wasn’t in the mood to deal with
trafﬁc today). Consequently, socially disconnected indivi-
duals should be motivated to anthropomorphize objects
around them to attain comfort and to establish control (Bartz
et al., 2016; MacInnis & Folkes, 2017; Waytz et al., 2010),
which should then increase the sentimental and instrumental
values of objects. Prior research has provided some support
for Epley et al.’s theoretical tenets. First, self-report studies
have shown that greater anxious interpersonal attachment
(chronic fear of abandonment) is associated with greater
acquisition tendencies (Norberg et al., 2018) and hoarding
severity (Medard & Kellett, 2014). Research also has shown
that acute social exclusion leads to greater anthropomor-
phism (Epley et al., 2008), and stronger anthropomorphic
tendencies are associated with greater object attachment and
acquiring difﬁculties (Burgess et al., 2018; Keefer, 2016;
Norberg et al., 2018; Timpano & Shaw, 2013). However,
prior research has not experimentally examined if social
disconnection leads to greater object attachment through
anthropomorphism’s effects on instrumental and sentimental
values.
The present study
This study used an experimental manipulation of social
exclusion to test the hypothesis that individuals are more
likely to anthropomorphize unowned items after being
socially rejected, as opposed to being included, and that
anthropomorphizing objects would lead to stronger senti-
mental and instrumental values, which would lead to greater
object attachment. We incorporated an overinclusion con-
dition to provide a direct recommendation on how treatment
for HD might be tailored to reduce anthropomorphism and
ultimately excessive object attachment. We examined indi-
viduals with acquiring problems and unowned items to ﬁll a
rather large gap in the literature.
METHODS
Participants and procedure
Individuals were recruited for a study on “why people like
gifts” using ﬂyers disseminated on and around campus,
online, and during talks on HD from October 2016 to
August 2017. These individuals completed the Saving
Inventory – Revised (SI-R; Frost, Steketee, & Grisham,
2004) online to determine their eligibility for the study.
Participants were eligible if they scored above the clinical
cut-off on the excessive acquisition subscale of the SI-R
(9+; Frost et al., 2004). Three hundred and sixty-one
participants above the age of 18 years eventually completed
this study. The majority of these participants scored above
other SI-R clinical cut-offs: 62.9% exceeded the discarding
difﬁculties clinical cut-off (SI-R≥ 14), 32.6% exceeded the
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excessive clutter clinical cut-off (SI-R≥ 17), and 55.9%
exceeded the SI-R total score clinical cut-off (SI-R≥ 41;
Frost & Hristova, 2011; Frost et al., 2004). After providing
informed consent, participants were randomly assigned to
be excluded, included, or overincluded in a ball-throwing
task (Cyberball; Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 2000). Imme-
diately after the task, participants completed the Need
Threat Questionnaire (Zadro, Williams, & Richardson,
2004), which measured their sense of belonging, control,
self-esteem, and meaningful existence.
Following this, participants were presented with ﬁve
potential “gifts” individually and in a randomized order
(adapted from Mead et al., 2011). As people are more likely
to anthropomorphize objects with physical human-like char-
acteristics (Aggarwal & McGill, 2007), we replicated previ-
ous studies’ procedures using items with distinct human-like
features (e.g., eyes and mouth; Bartz et al., 2016; Epley et al.,
2008). These items included an M&M’s on A Couch M&M
Dispenser, a clay plant pot with a painted face, a tea man
infuser, a wine holder in the form of a waiter, and robot salt/
pepper shakers (Appendix A). We used unowned items as we
aimed to examine what factors underlie object acquisition.
After viewing each object, participants completed question-
naires assessing its attributes and likeability. Participants
completed a manipulation check after viewing all gifts to
identify if they were aware of the purpose of the study before
being debriefed. All participants were reimbursed with course
credit or cash for participation in the study.
Social exclusion manipulation
Cyberball is a validated virtual ball-throwing task widely
used to study social exclusion (Williams et al., 2000). As
with previous Cyberball studies (e.g., Zadro et al., 2004),
participants were informed that the Cyberball task was a
mental visualization task to prepare them for the experiment.
During the Cyberball task (version 4; https://cyberball.
wikispaces.com/), participants imagined themselves playing
a ball-tossing game with two confederates named Sarah
and Matthew, whom the participant was led to believe
were participants from another university. This fallacy was
strengthened by the experimenter making a staged phone
call to ensure participants at the other university were ready
to begin (Zadro, Boland, & Richardson, 2006). Each player
was depicted as an animated digital avatar within the task.
Participants were instructed to throw the ball to one of the
other players after receiving it. Following procedures used
in previous studies (e.g., Van Beest & Williams, 2006;
Zadro et al., 2006), Cyberball was truncated to 30 throws
to avoid fatigue. Participants who were randomly assigned
to the overinclusion condition received the ball half of the
time (roughly 15 times), participants who were randomly
assigned to the inclusion condition received the ball one
third of the time (roughly 10 times), and participants who
were in the exclusion condition received the ball twice
before being excluded thereafter (e.g., Stillman et al., 2009).
Measures
Hoarding behaviors. The SI-R (Frost et al., 2004) is a self-
reported measure that assesses excessive acquisition, clutter,
and difﬁculty discarding. Participants responded to 23 items on
a scale ranging from 0 (none/not at all) to 4 (almost all/
extreme). The SI-R has demonstrated good reliability for all
three subscales in non-clinical and clinical samples (Moulding,
Nedeljkovic, Kyrios, Osborne, & Mogan, 2017; Norberg,
Keyan, & Grisham, 2015). The discarding and clutter sub-
scales demonstrated good reliability in this study (α= .82 and
.89, respectively), but the acquisition subscale demonstrated
poor reliability (α= .55) likely due to the restricted range of
scores on this subscale (Cortina, 1993).
Social exclusion manipulation check. Participants were
asked to complete the Need Threat Questionnaire (Zadro
et al., 2004) and the manipulation check question, “To what
extent were you included by other participants during the
game?” Reponses could range from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very
much so) and “excluded” participants had to score from 1 to
3, “included” participants had to score over 4, and “over-
included” participants had to score over 7 for their data to be
included in study analyses. The 12 items from the Need
Threat Questionnaire (Zadro et al., 2004) required partici-
pants to assess their levels of four fundamental psychologi-
cal needs (belonging, control, meaningful existence, and
self-esteem) on 9-point scales, from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very
much). Items for each need were averaged to obtain subscale
scores and higher scores referred to less belonging, less
control, lower self-esteem, and less meaningfulness. In this
study, items for belongingness (α= .79), control (α= .82),
self-esteem (α= .83), and meaningful existence (α= .72)
demonstrated adequate reliability.
Anthropomorphism. Participants rated the degree to
which the inanimate objects possessed human-like charac-
teristics using the Anthropomorphic Mental State ratings
scale (AMS; Epley et al., 2008). Using ﬁve items, the AMS
(Epley et al., 2008) assessed the extent to which each
potential “gift” had a mind of its own, intentions, free will,
consciousness, and emotions, on a scale from 1 (not at all) to
7 (very much). Responses for each object were individually
summed. These object totals were then averaged to derive a
total AMS score, with higher scores demonstrating stronger
anthropomorphism. The AMS has demonstrated adequate
internal consistency (Epley et al., 2008) and in the current
sample, it demonstrated good internal consistency for each
individual gift (ranged from α= .89–.90).
Object value. To assess sentimental and instrumental
values, we used nine items derived from Mead et al.’s
(2011) study on social exclusion and consumer behavior,
and Richins’ (1994) study on object value. Two authors
categorized these items into two categories separately using
the deﬁnitions of sentimental and instrumental values pro-
vided by Frost and Steketee (2008). The two authors
resolved discrepancies through discussion. The ﬁnal senti-
mental value subscale consisted of six items addressing the
emotional meaning of an object and the association between
the object to a particular social connection (“it would
provide comfort and emotional security,” “it would remind
me of my relationship with a particular person,” “it would
express what is unique about me, different from others,” “it
would remind me of my family or a group of people I belong
to,” “it would remind me of particular events or places,” and
“it would be a record of my personal history”) using a
7-point scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much so). In the
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current sample, interitem correlations were medium to large
for each individual gift (correlation coefﬁcients ranged from
r= .33–.65) (Hemphill, 2003). The sentimental subscale
demonstrated good internal consistency for each individual
gift (ranged from α= .83–.85). The ﬁnal instrumental value
subscale consisted of three items addressing general percep-
tions of the potential utility or function of an object (“it
would make me socially desirable, it would impress others,”
“it would be practically useful,” “it would provide an
opportunity to improve my life”) on the same 7-point scale.
In the current sample, interitem correlations were small to
medium for each individual gift (correlation coefﬁcients
ranged from r= .27–.48). The instrumental subscale
demonstrated poor to adequate internal consistency for each
gift (ranged from α= .60–.70). This low Cronbach’s α
coefﬁcient is possibly due to the small number of items on
the instrumental value subscale (Cortina, 1993) or the
variability in instrumental value items on the scale.
Object attachment. Participants were asked three ques-
tions to assess object attachment: “How much do you like
the object?,” “How much do you desire to own the object?,”
and “How much would you like to receive the object as a
gift?” These questions were created speciﬁcally for this
study and were scored on a 7-point scale from 1 (not at
all) to 7 (very much so) and then averaged. The questions
demonstrated excellent reliability for each individual gift
(ranged from α= .92–.93).
Demographics. Participants were asked to complete a
brief demographic questionnaire indicating their gender,
age, ethnicity, whether they were currently studying at
university, and the amount of tertiary education they had
completed.
Statistical analysis
All statistical analyses were performed using SPSS 24.0
(IBM Cooperation, New York, USA). Before testing study
hypotheses, we checked the data for statistical assumptions
and usability. We then examined the effect of our social
exclusion manipulation on variables of interest before run-
ning correlational analyses to examine bivariate relation-
ships between our variables of interest.
In our ﬁnal model, we used Model 4 of the PROCESS v
2.16 macro (Hayes, 2013) to test a parallel mediation model
between X and Y through M1 and M2. PROCESS utilizes
bias-corrected bootstrapping to access the indirect and direct
effects of the variables by examining approximations of the
estimated product of coefﬁcients in the indirect paths
(Hayes, 2013). To determine the signiﬁcance of the indirect
effect, 95% conﬁdence intervals (CIs) were used, with
conﬁdence intervals resampled 10,000 times for each anal-
ysis (Hayes, 2013; Preacher & Hayes, 2008). To improve
our conﬁdence in the proposed model, we also ran models
that reversed our mediators with our dependent variable
(Sheets & Braver, 1999).
Ethics
The study procedures were carried out in accordance with
the Declaration of Helsinki. The institutional review
board at Macquarie University approved the study. All
participants were informed about the study and provided
informed consent prior to initiating the study. They were
also provided with an opportunity to reconsent for the use of
their data in research when debriefed about the use of
deception at the end of the experimental session.
RESULTS
Social exclusion manipulation check
Of the 361 participants who completed the study, ﬁve
Cyberball “excluded” participants were excluded from the
study, because they did not report low feelings of inclusion
after Cyberball. Five “included” and six “overincluded”
participants were also excluded for not feeling included
enough. A further 14 participants were excluded as they
reported being fully aware of the aims of the study before
being debriefed. Cut-off criteria were derived from mean
manipulation check scores reported in previous studies
(e.g., Williams et al., 2000; Zadro et al., 2004). Descriptive
characteristics and group comparisons on variables of inter-
est for the ﬁnal sample (N= 331) are presented in Table 1.
Of the 331 participants, 107 participants were randomly
allocated to the exclusion condition, 111 to the inclusion
condition, and 113 to the overinclusion condition.
As shown in Table 1, the groups differed in their four
need threats and perceptions of inclusion after Cyberball,
p< .001. Contrast analyses demonstrated that excluded
participants reported feeling less included than included
participants, t(328)=−28.03, p< .001, and that included
participants felt less included than overincluded partici-
pants, t(328)= 11.77, p< .001. As for threats to the four
fundamental psychological needs, excluded participants
reported lower feelings of belongingness, t(328)= 21.87,
p< .001; having less control, t(328)= 20.76, p< .001; less
meaningful existence, t(328)= 18.38, p< .001; and lower
self-esteem, t(328)= 14.64, p< .001 than included partici-
pants, whereas included participants reported lower feelings
of belongingness, t(328)=−4.56, p< .001; having less
control, t(328)=−4.91, p< .001; less meaningful exis-
tence, t(328)=−3.00, p= .003; and lower self-esteem,
t(328)=−2.98, p= .003, than overincluded participants.
Social exclusion analyses
Before testing our hypothesized model, we ran preliminary
tests to assess for statistically signiﬁcant relationships be-
tween the study variables. Although all objects in this study
had human-like qualities, people who compulsively acquire
are known to view each object as inﬁnitely unique (Kyrios,
Frost, & Steketee, 2004). Thus, we ﬁrst checked scores for
anthropomorphism, object attachment, and value to under-
stand, if the objects were perceived differently. Although
the items differed slightly in anthropomorphism, sentimental
and instrumental values, and object attachment (Appendix B),
a mixed model analysis of variance revealed that anthropo-
morphism, sentimental value, and instrumental value scores
for each individual gift did not differ as a function of our
social exclusion manipulation (all ps> .05). Thus, we aver-
aged the scores for each individual gift to create mean
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anthropomorphism, sentimental value, instrumental value,
and object attachment scores. Our social exclusion manipu-
lation did not affect anthropomorphism, F(2, 328)= 1.94,
p= .146; instrumental value, F(2, 328)= 2.64, p= .073; or
object attachment, F(2, 328)= 1.45, p= .237; however, it
affected sentimental value, such that overincluded and in-
cluded participants reported greater sentimental attachment to
the objects than excluded participants, F(1, 328)=6.28,
p= .013. As the magnitude of the effect was small,
ηp2= 0.02, the social exclusion variable was dropped from
further analyses.
Although the social exclusion manipulation did not
meaningfully affect the value of objects or participants’
attachment to the objects, we conducted an unplanned
multiple regression model to determine if threats to the
four psychological needs were predictive of anthropomor-
phism. Threats to belongingness, control, and meaningful
existence were not associated with greater anthropomor-
phism (all p’s≥ .331); however, greater threat to one’s self-
esteem was associated with greater anthropomorphism,
b= 0.14, SE= 0.055, β= 0.134, t(329) = 2.46, p= .014.
Pearson’s correlation coefﬁcients were then calculated
for the whole sample to identify the size of bivariate
relationships between anthropomorphism, instrumental val-
ue, sentimental value, and object attachment for the overall
sample. Our main variables of interest did not differ depend-
ing on gender. In regard to ethnicity, Caucasian participants
rated each individual item as less human-like than Asian
participants, F(1, 326)= 13.66, p< .001. We did not com-
plete further analyses by gender or ethnicity. As we identi-
ﬁed positive bivariate relationships between our variables of
interest (Table 2), we proceeded with running a parallel
multiple mediation model (Hayes, 2013). Parallel multiple
mediation tested the hypothesis that sentimental and instru-
mental value may contribute to object attachment.
Parallel mediation analyses
Figure 1 presents the results from the parallel mediation tests
using ordinary least squares path analysis (Model 4; Hayes,
2013) to examine the relationship between anthropomor-
phism and object attachment through instrumental and







(n= 113) Statistics p value
Sex (% female) 256 (77.3%) 76 (71.0%) 92 (82.9%) 88 (77.9%) χ2(2)= 4.40 .111
Age (years) 22.88 (7.75) 22.48 (7.73) 22.39 (6.61) 23.75 (8.74) F(2, 328)= 1.09 .339
Ethnicity χ2(8)= 5.20 .736
Caucasian 104 (31.4%) 37 (34.6%) 31 (27.9%) 36 (31.9%)
European 35 (10.6%) 11 (10.3%) 8 (7.2%) 16 (14.2%)
Middle Eastern 19 (5.7%) 5 (4.7%) 8 (7.2%) 6 (5.3%)
Asian 143 (43.2%) 44 (41.1%) 54 (48.6%) 45 (39.8%)
Other 30 (9.1%) 10 (9.3%) 10 (9.0%) 10 (8.8%)
Completed tertiary
education (years)
2.07 (1.26) 1.96 (1.24) 2.05 (1.28) 2.18 (1.26) F(2, 327)= 0.80 .448
SI-R Total 43.42 (12.17) 43.22 (13.01) 43.71 (11.66) 43.33 (11.95) F(2, 328)= 0.05 .951
Acquisition 14.78 (3.40) 14.67 (3.42) 14.78 (3.44) 15.07 (3.35) F(2, 328)= 0.86 .422
Discarding 15.08 (4.84) 14.89 (5.03) 15.04 (4.82) 15.31 (4.72) F(2, 328)= 0.22 .805
Clutter 13.59 (6.82) 13.86 (7.80) 13.94 (6.25) 12.98 (6.37) F(2, 328)= 0.67 .510
Manipulation checka – 2.41 (0.82)a 6.67 (1.48)b 8.43 (0.95)c F(2, 328)= 832.10 <.001**
Need threat
Belonging – 7.38 (1.22)a 3.54 (1.32)b 2.76 (1.34)c F(2, 328)= 397.58 <.001**
Control – 7.30 (1.09)a 3.47 (1.50)b 2.58 (1.45)c F(2, 328)= 369.90 <.001**
Self-esteem – 5.93 (1.72)a 2.99 (1.55)b 2.40 (1.13)c F(2, 328)= 177.21 <.001**
Meaningful existence – 6.70 (1.55)a 3.18 (1.28)b 2.61 (1.41)c F(2, 328)= 266.78 <.001**
Anthropomorphism 12.19 (6.47) 12.01 (6.23) 13.12 (7.00) 11.45 (6.06) F(2, 328)= 1.94 .146
Note. Parameter estimates in each row that share superscripts do not differ signiﬁcantly. χ2: chi-square, F: F-statistic.
aThe manipulation check score represents an average of two items on a 9-point scale (ranging from 1= not at all to 9= very much so): “To
what extent were you included : : : ” and “Rejected – Accepted” (bipolar scale). A higher score refers to greater inclusion.
Table 2. Count, percentages, and zero-order correlations for measures of interest
Mean (SD) Anthropomorphism Instrumental Sentimental Object attachment
1. Anthropomorphism 12.19 (6.47) –
2. Instrumental 3.26 (0.94) .410** –
3. Sentimental 3.05 (1.13) .441** .656** –
4. Object attachment 4.52 (1.04) .201** .609** .455** –
Note. Pearson’s correlations are noted in the table. SD: standard deviation of the mean.
**p< .01.
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sentimental values. As shown in Figure 1, stronger anthro-
pomorphism predicted greater instrumental value, t(329)=
7.81, p< .001, 95% CI [0.04, 0.07] and greater sentimental
value, t(329)= 8.70, p< .001, 95% CI [0.06, 0.09]. Greater
instrumental value, t(327) = 10.34, p< .001, 95% CI [0.51,
0.74] and greater sentimental value, t(327) = 2.09, p= .037,
95% CI [0.01, 0.22] predicted greater object attachment. A
bias-corrected bootstrap conﬁdence interval for the indirect
effect based on 10,000 bootstrap intervals was entirely
above zero for instrumental value, 95% CI [0.03, 0.05] and
sentimental value, 95% CI [0.00, 0.02]. The strength of the
indirect effects suggested that the indirect effect via instru-
mental value was greater than the indirect effect via senti-
mental value, 95% CI [0.01, 0.05]. There was no evidence
of a direct effect (c’) between anthropomorphism and liking,
95% CI [−0.03, 0.00], though the total effect (c) was
statistically signiﬁcant, 95% CI [0.02, 0.05], which provides
evidence for full mediation. In our reversed models with
instrumental and sentimental values as the outcome
variable, both models demonstrated partial mediation
(direct effect/s: c’= 0.22, SE= 0.01, 95% CI [0.01, 0.03];
c’= 0.04, SE= 0.01, 95% CI [0.02, 0.05], respectively),
increasing our conﬁdence for the proposed model.
DISCUSSION
This study aimed to test whether acute social exclusion
increased object attachment via anthropomorphism’s effects
on an object’s perceived instrumental and sentimental values.
When including, excluding, or overincluding participants in
an online ball-tossing game, we did not ﬁnd a relationship
between social exclusion and anthropomorphism. However,
consistent with our hypotheses, greater instrumental and
sentimental values mediated the relationship between anthro-
pomorphism and greater liking of unowned objects.
Overall, this study adds to the body of research that
inconsistently links social exclusion and loneliness with
anthropomorphism (Bartz et al., 2016; Claus & Warlop,
2011; Epley et al., 2008; Feng, 2016). There are a number of
reasons why this study may have been unable to replicate
previous ﬁndings that social exclusion leads to stronger
anthropomorphic tendencies (Bartz et al., 2016; Epley et al.,
2008). First, in regard to anthropomorphism, we showed
participants ﬁve “gifts” that they were not allowed to keep.
Anthropomorphizing and seeking comfort from an object
that cannot be owned may be dangerous as it could lead to
further social exclusion (Cacioppo, Norris, Decety,
Monteleone, & Nusbaum, 2009; Feng, 2016; Park &Maner,
2009). Thus, socially excluded individuals may be more
likely to anthropomorphize and seek comfort from objects
that can be owned. Research on HD highlights the impor-
tance of ownership as individuals with HD only appear to
have difﬁculty making decisions about personal items
(Grisham, Norberg, Williams, Certoma, & Kadib, 2010;
Tolin et al., 2012; Wincze, Steketee, & Frost, 2007).
Second, the AMS (Epley et al., 2008) items are abstract
and philosophical (e.g., “free will” and “consciousness”),
which require complex deductive reasoning skills to answer
(Neave et al., 2015). Dispositional measures have been
revised in recent years to reduce this abstract nature
(e.g., the Graves Anthropomorphic Task Scale, Burgess,
et al., 2018; Anthropomorphism Questionnaire, Neave et al.,
2015), but this has yet to be done for situational measures.
Based on measures from the dispositional literature, items
such as “this object has a friendly personality”may be easier
for individuals to comprehend and answer (Burgess et al.,
2018; Neave et al., 2015).
Our social exclusion manipulation may also explain
why we did not ﬁnd a relationship between social exclusion
and anthropomorphism. First, we studied acute social ex-
clusion, whereas other studies have focused on chronic
loneliness (Bartz et al., 2016; Epley et al., 2008). While
both loneliness and social exclusion lead to deﬁcits in
belongingness (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), these two forms
of low belonging may not motivate the same behavior
Figure 1. Multiple (parallel) mediation model of anthropomorphism (X) to object attachment (Y) through instrumental (M1) and sentimental
value (M2). Unstandardized coefﬁcients and standard errors of the mean (SE) are displayed in the ﬁgure. Standardized coefﬁcients are
displayed in parentheses next to the unstandardized coefﬁcients
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(Stillman et al., 2009). In addition, this study found that
greater threats to one’s self-esteem, but not threats to be-
longingness, led to greater anthropomorphism. This suggests
that examining threats to self-esteem may help us better
understand what leads to anthropomorphism, and ultimately
object attachment (Park &Maner, 2009). Second, attachment
theory predicts that social exclusion only results in negative
consequences when it is done by signiﬁcant others (Bowlby,
1969; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2016). As participants in this
study were rejected by “strangers,” our social exclusion
manipulation may not have been sufﬁcient to induce anthro-
pomorphism. Manipulations that require participants to re-
call a time in which they were excluded or unsupported by a
close friend or loved one (e.g., Keefer, Landau, Rothschild,
& Sullivan, 2012; Mourey, Olson, & Yoon, 2017) may be
more likely to induce anthropomorphism. Thus, future stud-
ies should allow participants to take home study items, use a
measure of chronic loneliness, an anxious attachment prim-
ing manipulation, and a more concrete, contextual measure
of anthropomorphism to clarify the relationship between
social exclusion and anthropomorphism.
Our hypothesis that stronger anthropomorphism would
predict greater sentimental and instrumental values, which
would in turn lead to greater object attachment was sup-
ported. This ﬁnding is in line with theoretical models (Epley
et al., 2007; Frost & Hartl, 1996), and with prior research
documenting a link between anthropomorphism and com-
fort and security (Keefer, 2016; Neave et al., 2016). While
the role of sentimental value in hoarding has been well-
acknowledged within the literature (e.g., Frost & Hartl,
1996; Steketee, Frost, & Kyrios, 2003), a growing amount
of research has demonstrated that individuals with HD
acquire and save potentially useful items to avoid guilt
associated with wasting useful objects (Frost, Steketee,
Tolin, Sinopoli, & Ruby, 2015; Nordsletten et al., 2013).
This suggests that examining an object’s perceived
instrumental value is as important as understanding how
individuals with HD might derive comfort from an anthro-
pomorphized item. However, before being able to effective-
ly integrate Epley et al.’s (2007) tenets to Frost and Hartl’s
(1996) cognitive-behavioral model of HD, we need to better
understand what mechanisms acutely lead to anthropomor-
phism. This should involve examining how threats to one’s
self-esteem may motivate individuals to anthropomorphize
and acquire new items. Consumer and social psychologists
have posited that people purchase consumer goods that
represent their own values in order to enhance their self-
esteem (Arndt, Solomon, Kasser, & Sheldon, 2004; Richins,
1994). These goods may in turn form part of one’s extended
self and reﬂect one’s personal identity (Belk, 1988). While
difﬁculties with self-concept appear to be related to hoard-
ing and compulsive buying (Frost, Kyrios, McCarthy, &
Matthews, 2007), few studies have experimentally exam-
ined how threats to one’s self-esteem or self-concept may
motivate individuals to seek social connection and attach-
ment in objects. Exploring this may help us better under-
stand what mechanisms lead to anthropomorphism and
object attachment in HD.
Although cultural inﬂuences on anthropomorphism were
not part of our main hypotheses, our ﬁnding that Asian
participants had higher average anthropomorphism scores
than Caucasian participants contributes to the limited re-
search on culture and anthropomorphism. In the three-factor
theory of anthropomorphism, Epley et al. (2007) posited
that people from collectivist cultures may anthropomorphize
more than people from individualistic cultures due to the
value placed on social afﬁliation in collectivist cultures
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Similar to this study, Wang
(2017) found that Asian undergraduates anthropomorphized
their smartphones more than Caucasian participants, but
found that cultural orientation, one’s personal afﬁliation
toward collectivism and individualism, did not affect
anthropomorphism. This suggests that the relationship be-
tween culture and anthropomorphism is complex and per-
haps cannot be reduced to a simple dichotomy between
collectivism and individualism, particularly in predominant-
ly westernized samples (Wang, 2017).
Limitations
The results of this study should be interpreted considering
its limitations. First, in regard to measurement issues,
although we followed Frost and Steketee’s (2008) deﬁni-
tions for sentimental and instrumental values when catego-
rizing items on our object value measure, our measure has
not been validated. Our instrumental value subscale dem-
onstrated α ratings of low reliability (α= .60–.70), and
although this could be explained by the limited number of
items on the subscale (Cortina, 1993), it is also possible that
our instrumental value subscale was too broad or multidi-
mensional (e.g., a scale that measures practical utility,
functional ability, etc.; Schmitt, 1996). For example, items
such as “ : : : it would be practically useful” and “ : : : it
would impress others” may not target the same type of
utilitarian value. As individuals with HD may anthropomor-
phize their possessions due to a strong sense of responsibil-
ity to protect and control their items (Frost, Hartl, Christian,
&Williams, 1995), it may be beneﬁcial to include items that
address the functional ability of an item in establishing
control before using exploratory and conﬁrmatory factor
analyses to examine the psychometric properties of this
measure. Second, in this study, the SI-R acquisition subscale
had poor internal consistency (α= .57). Although this could
imply that the subscale is multidimensional (Schmitt, 1996),
others have criticized the accuracy of Cronbach’s α in
capturing the internal consistency of a measure (Sijtsma,
2009). In order to address this, future studies may choose to
utilize structural equation modeling to better assess correla-
tions of latent variables underlying acquisition in hoarding.
Third, although we chose to look at items with human-
like physical characteristics, because they are more likely to
be anthropomorphized than objects without these features
(Aggarwal & McGill, 2007; Epley et al., 2007), we may not
have needed to do this, because individuals with HD assign
human-like characteristics to possessions regardless of their
resemblance to humans (Frost & Hartl, 1996). As people
with HD save clothes, books, and letters more frequently
than novelty items (Mogan, Kyrios, Schweitzer, Yap, &
Moulding, 2012), future studies should utilize such objects.
Finally, many participants in this study were university
students with SI-R acquisition scores in the subclinical to
clinical range. As we did not include a diagnostic interview,
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we do not know how many participants met diagnostic
criteria for HD. Thus, our ﬁndings may not be representative
of a clinical hoarding population. Thus, caution should be
made when drawing direct inferences of our ﬁndings to
individuals with HD.
CONCLUSIONS
Despite these limitations, this study is the ﬁrst experimental
investigation that tests the tenets of Epley’s theory of
anthropomorphism and Frost and Hartl’s (1996) cogni-
tive-behavioral model of hoarding concurrently. Although
we did not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relationship between acute
social exclusion and anthropomorphism, the study found
cross-sectional empirical evidence that individuals with
acquiring problems may like unowned objects they perceive
as human-like as these items seem sentimental and useful.
In order to obtain data necessary for expanding Frost and
Hartl’s (1996) cognitive-behavioral model of hoarding,
future research should include an anxious attachment
priming manipulation, psychometrically validated object
attachment and anthropomorphism measures, and allow
participants to keep the objects examined in order to mimic
real-life to a greater degree.
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Object attachment
APPENDIX A: PICTURES OF THE FIVE “GIFTS” USED IN THE STUDY
APPENDIX B: PRELIMINARY STATISTICS FOR EACH “GIFT”
Table B1. Means, standard deviations, count and percentages for each gift
Anthropomorphism Instrumental value Sentimental value Object attachment
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
M&Ms dispenser 11.12 (7.13)c 2.97 (1.37)a 3.01 (1.43)a 4.48 (1.78)a
Plant pot with face 14.63 (8.43)a 2.92 (1.37)a 3.51 (1.48)b 4.77 (1.65)b
Salt and pepper shakers 12.25 (7.21)b 3.25 (1.30)b 2.74 (1.39)c 4.41 (1.76)a
Wine bottle holder 11.25 (6.98)c 3.23 (1.26)b 2.80 (1.41)c 3.98 (1.72)c
Tea man infuser 11.71 (7.49)c 3.91 (1.35)c 3.20 (1.48)d 4.97 (1.59)b
Note. Parameter estimates in each column that share subscripts (i.e., a, b, and c) do not differ signiﬁcantly.M: mean; SD: standard deviation of
the mean. Repeated measures ANOVA for anthropomorphism: F(4, 1320)= 39.11, p< .001; instrumental value: F(4, 1320)= 46.45,
p< .001, η2p= 0.12, for sentimentality: F(4, 1320)= 32.81, p< .001, η2p= 0.09, and for object attachment: F(4, 1320)= 20.70, p< .001,
η2p= 0.06.
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